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Article

Are State Constitutions Constitutional?
Timothy M. Tymkovich

†

During Reconstruction, Senator Charles Sumner from
Massachusetts famously referred to the Guarantee Clause as
1
the “sleeping giant” of the Constitution. Radical Republicans
like Sumner believed that the Clause’s command that “[t]he
United States shall guarantee to every State in this Union a
2
Republican Form of Government” could be used as a tool for
3
reforming the governments of the Confederate states. But
nearly 150 years later, the giant has still not awakened. Article
IV, Section 4 of the U.S. Constitution has not emerged as a tool
to police the structure of state government. Indeed, the Supreme Court has long refused even to adjudicate claims under
4
the Guarantee Clause—they are nonjusticiable.
At first glance, the courts’ historical reluctance to adjudicate such claims is striking in light of the Clause’s seemingly
simple language. It tracks the logical inference that a Union
cannot be established if some of its members are monarchies,
† Judge Timothy M. Tymkovich sits on the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Tenth Circuit. He previously served as the Solicitor General for the Office of
the Attorney General of Colorado. Judge Tymkovich received his J.D. from the
University of Colorado and his Bachelors in Political Science from the Colorado College. He appreciates the assistance of Teresa Helms and Will Johnston
in preparing this article. Copyright © 2013 by Timothy M. Tymkovich.
1. WILLIAM M. WIECEK, THE GUARANTEE CLAUSE OF THE U.S. CONSTITUTION 2 (1972).
2. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 4.
3. See David Tyack & Robert Lowe, The Constitutional Moment: Reconstruction and Black Education in the South, 94 AM. J. EDUC. 236, 238 (1986).
4. See, e.g., City of Rome v. United States, 446 U.S. 156, 182 n.17 (1980)
(“We do not reach the merits of the appellants’ argument that the Act violates
the Guarantee Clause, Art. IV, § 4, since that issue is not justiciable.”), superseded by statute, 42 U.S.C. § 1973b(a)(1), as recognized in Northwest Austin
Mun. Utility Dist. No. One v. Holder, 557 U.S. 193, 209–10 (2009); Baker v.
Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 224 (1962) (“[T]he Court has consistently held that a challenge to state action based on the Guaranty [sic] Clause presents no justiciable
question . . . .”).
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5

aristocracies, or dictatorships. But the Clause’s text does not
indicate how or by whom this clause is to be enforced. No hints
suggest the kinds of limits the Clause places on state governments. And despite historical clues gleaned from the Founders’
6
concept of a republican government, the Constitution does not
articulate clear standards for determining whether a particular
7
government adheres to a “republican form.”
The use of “republican” suggests that the state must have
some form of representative government, but the variation
could be quite wide. Must state government look like the federal government, with a bicameral legislature that makes all the
law? Or can the power rest with the people through various
forms of direct democracy? The absence of standards explains
much of the judicial reluctance to wade into this definitional
thicket.
This Article will examine several legal questions that
might arise in disputes involving the Guarantee Clause. First,
what is the state of the law over district court jurisdiction to
hear the merits of the Guarantee Clause challenge? Second, at
what point does the Guarantee Clause become a limit on the
state’s ability to structure its government in a way that is at
odds with the federal model?
Part I will discuss the original meaning of the Guarantee
Clause and the line of cases that applied the political question
doctrine to claims arising under the Clause. Part II will address
the definitional boundaries on what constitutes a republican
government in light of state procedures authorizing the referendum and initiative, so-called direct democracy. Part III will
consider whether courts are likely to find claims under the
Guarantee Clause against voter initiative to be justiciable.

5. MICHAEL STOKES PAULSEN ET AL., THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED
STATES 1650 (2010).
6. See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST NO. 39, at 193 (James Madison) (Ian
Shapiro ed., 2009) (defining a republic as “a government which derives all its
powers directly or indirectly from the great body of the people, and is administered by persons holding their offices during pleasure for a limited period, or
during good behavior”).
7. See, e.g., Jacob M. Heller, Note, Death by a Thousand Cuts: The Guarantee Clause Regulation of State Constitutions, 62 STAN. L. REV. 1711, 1716
(2010) (“While scholars have shed light on what the Guarantee Clause covers,
how the Clause is implemented has been drastically underevaluated.”).

1806

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

[97:1804

I. DEBATE OVER THE MEANING OF THE GUARANTEE
CLAUSE
A. ORIGINAL UNDERSTANDING OF THE CLAUSE
Considerable debate animates the scholarship over the
8
original purposes and understanding of the Clause. Some
commentators argue that the Clause’s purpose is narrowly limited to preventing states from becoming monarchies, dictator9
ships, or aristocracies. Others maintain that the Clause was
10
intended to be a broader restriction on state government.
One logical way to begin an analysis of constitutional
words, phrases, and clauses is with a presumption that the
Framers of the Constitution intended the words they used to
have the meaning they understood them to have. Accordingly,
the historical context giving rise to the U.S. Constitution provides valuable instruction on how to interpret the text and
structure of Constitution, including the Guarantee Clause. How
would an objective, well-informed person understand the mean11
ing of the text in question?
A central concept in American constitutionalism is “[t]hat
all lawful power derives from the people and must be held in
12
check to preserve their freedom.” “A system of government in
which the people hold sovereign power and elect representatives who exercise that power” is commonly known as a “repub13
lic.” A republican government is distinguishable from a “pure
democracy,” in which the people as a whole hold and exercise
the sovereign power of the government, and from a governmen14
tal regime ruled by one person or an elite group. In Federalist
No. 39, James Madison defined a “republic” as “a government
which derives all its powers directly or indirectly from the great
8. For list of scholarly authorities discussing appropriate uses of the
Guarantee Clause, see id. at 1713–16 nn.4–14.
9. See, e.g., Robert G. Natelson, A Republic, Not a Democracy?—
Initiative, Referendum, and the Constitution’s Guarantee Clause, 80 TEX. L.
REV. 807, 824–25 (2002).
10. See, e.g., Heller, supra note 7, at 1716 (stating that “[g]iven the extreme unlikelihood that a state will crown a king or descend into anarchy,” the
idea that the Guarantee Clause is not implicated unless a state completely
ceases to be republican in form “ensures its desuetude”).
11. See ANTONIN SCALIA & BRYAN A. GARNER, READING LAW: THE INTERPRETATION OF LEGAL TEXTS 78–90 (2012).
12. LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 6–7 (3rd ed.
2000).
13. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1418 (9th ed. 2009).
14. Id.
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body of the people, and is administered by persons holding
their offices during pleasure for a limited period, or during good
15
behavior.” The Framers of the Constitution provided for the
indirect exercise of sovereign power because they believed that
human rights were best protected when shielded by “deliberate16
ly fragmented centers of countervailing power.” To them, centralized accumulation of power in any person or single group of
persons meant tyranny, whereas the division and separation of
17
powers meant liberty.
One of the original aims of the Constitution was to address
18
the defects associated with the Articles of Confederation. The
idea that a guarantee of republican government was necessary
grew from the recognition of one defect in particular—the Articles of Confederation gave the federal government no power to
19
suppress a rebellion in any state. In a letter to Edmund Randolph dated April 8, 1787, James Madison wrote: “An article
ought to be inserted expressly guarantying [sic] the tranquility
20
of the States agst. [sic] internal as well as external dangers.”
Madison later explained that the national government’s power
to guarantee a republican form of government in the states was
necessary “[i]n a confederacy founded on republican principles . . . to defend the system against aristocratic or monarchial
21
innovations.” At the Constitutional Convention, proponents of
the guarantee explained that the purpose of securing a republican government was to secure the states against dangerous
22
commotions, insurrections, and rebellions.
Indeed, the proximate motivation for the Clause’s insertion
was likely Shays’s Rebellion, an armed movement of aggrieved

15. THE FEDERALIST NO. 39, supra note 6, at 193 (James Madison); see
also PAULSEN ET AL., supra note 5, at 1650.
16. TRIBE, supra note 12, at 7.
17. See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST NO. 28, supra note 6, (Alexander Hamilton),
NOS. 10, 41, 47, 51 (James Madison).
18. See WIECEK, supra note 1, at 60 (discussing the development of the
Guarantee Clause and the Founders’ determination that it be “more effective”
than the Articles of Confederation).
19. See id. (mentioning how the Articles of Confederation prevented the
Confederation Congress from taking action to suppress Shays’s Rebellion).
20. Letter from James Madison to Edmund Randolph (Apr. 8, 1787),
available at http://teachingamericanhistory.org/library/index.asp?document=
1584.
21. THE FEDERALIST NO. 43, supra note 6, at 222 (James Madison).
22. 5 JONATHAN ELLIOT, DEBATES ON THE ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL
CONSTITUTION 332–33 (1891).
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farmers and debtors in Western Massachusetts. The rebels
prevented the enforcement of debts and the collection of taxes,
which caused great alarm among the governing and merchant
24
classes. The prospect of state government descending into
lawlessness convinced many of the delegates to the Constitutional Convention that the new national government needed
the authority, if necessary, to send in troops to end mob rule
25
and reestablish representative government. The new Constitution, with the Guarantee Clause in Article IV, would provide
26
that authority.
B. POLITICAL QUESTION DOCTRINE AS A BAR TO JUDICIAL
INTERPRETATION
Despite the broad wording of the Guarantee Clause, courts
have not ventured to decide whether the Clause extends beyond
its apparent historical purpose of authorizing the suppression
of insurrections. Courts mostly decline to exercise jurisdiction
27
over Guarantee Clause challenges. In many of the cases in
which litigants have asked the Supreme Court to apply the
Clause, the Court has found the claims to be nonjusticiable “po28
litical questions.” State courts have also been reluctant to decide the merits of challenges brought under the Guarantee
29
Clause. As a result, the Clause has been an infrequent basis
for litigation. Some scholars and litigants, however, argue that
30
the merits of such claims should be decided by the courts.
23. Jonathon K. Waldrop, Note, Rousing the Sleeping Giant? Federalism
and the Guarantee Clause, 15 J.L. & POL. 267, 272 (1999).
24. For a discussion and overview of Shays’s Rebellion, see WIECEK, supra
note 1, at 27–42.
25. See id. at 27–33. Some have argued, however, that even in the absence
of the Rebellion the Constitution would have resembled its current form. See,
e.g., Robert A. Feer, Shays’s Rebellion and the Constitution: A Study in Causation, 42 NEW ENG. Q. 388, 410 (1969).
26. Authority to end internal violence is authorized by the Domestic Violence Clause, also contained within Section 4 of Article IV. U.S. CONST. art. IV,
§ 4.
27. See Heller, supra note 7, at 1727.
28. See, e.g., City of Rome v. United States, 446 U.S. 156, 182 n.17 (1980),
superseded by statute, 42 U.S.C. 1973b(a)(1), as recognized in Northwest Austin Mun. Utility Dist. No. One v. Holder, 557 U.S. 193, 209–10 (2009); Baker v.
Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 218–29 (1962); Pac. States Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Oregon, 223
U.S. 118, 140–51 (1912).
29. See, e.g., Hammond v. Clark, 71 S.E. 479, 489 (Ga. 1911); Kadderly v.
City of Portland, 74 P. 710, 719 (Or. 1903).
30. See, e.g., Erwin Chemerinsky, Cases Under the Guarantee Clause
Should Be Justiciable, 65 U. COLO. L. REV. 849, 868–69 (1994); Heller, supra
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In Marbury v. Madison, Justice Marshall anticipated the
political question doctrine when he stated: “Questions in their
nature political, or which are, by the constitution and laws,
31
submitted to the executive, can never be made in this court.”
The modern prudentially based political question doctrine instructs Article III courts to avoid deciding questions that the
Supreme Court deems more suitable for other branches of government, even if all the other jurisdictional and justiciability
32
requirements for adjudication are met. The Court has stated
that the political question doctrine “is designed to restrain the
Judiciary from inappropriate interference in the business of the
33
other branches of Government.”
To understand the doctrine, one must examine the specific
areas in which the Supreme Court has applied it. One way to
organize these cases is by the type of legal issue in dispute. The
Supreme Court has deemed the following challenges to be polit34
ical questions: claims arising under the Guarantee Clause,
35
challenges to constitutional amendments, suits involving the
36
validity of foreign or military affairs, disputes over the propri37
ety of congressional self-governance, and controversies regard38
ing impeachment.
Another way to address political question precedent is by
39
focusing on the Baker factors. In Baker v. Carr, the Supreme
Court identified six criteria that a court should consider when
deciding whether a particular case presents a political question:
Prominent on the surface of any case held to involve a political question is found [1] a textually demonstrable constitutional commitment

note 7, at 1749–52.
31. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 170 (1803).
32. See, e.g., Nixon v. United States, 506 U.S. 224 (1993).
33. United States v. Munoz-Flores, 495 U.S. 385, 394 (1990).
34. Luther v. Borden, 48 U.S. (7 How.) 1, 42 (1849) (stating that under the
Guarantee Clause, “it rests with Congress to decide what government is the
established one in a State”).
35. Coleman v. Miller, 307 U.S. 433, 457–59 (1939) (plurality opinion).
36. Oetjen v. Cent. Leather Co., 246 U.S. 297, 303 (1918) (holding that an
action in Mexico “of the legitimate Mexican government . . . is not subject to
reexamination and modification by the courts of this country”).
37. Field v. Clark, 143 U.S. 649 (1892). But see Powell v. McCormack, 395
U.S. 486 (1969) (holding justiciable the question of the substance of congressional qualifications but not the decision of whether a member satisfied those
qualifications).
38. Nixon v. United States, 506 U.S. 224 (1993).
39. 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
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of the issue to a coordinate political department; or [2] a lack of judicially discoverable and manageable standards for resolving it; or [3]
the impossibility of deciding without an initial policy determination of
a kind clearly for nonjudicial discretion; or [4] the impossibility of a
court’s undertaking independent resolution without expressing lack of
the respect due coordinate branches of government; or [5] an unusual
need for unquestioning adherence to a political decision already
made; or [6] the potentiality of embarrassment from multifarious
40
pronouncements by various departments on one question.

The six “Baker factors,” however, have confused courts because
the factors are subject to varied interpretations and do not
41
amount to a clear rule. For example, Nixon v. United States
involved a dispute under the Impeachment Clause, which provides, in part: “The Senate shall have the sole Power to try all
42
Impeachments. . . .” Walter L. Nixon, a former federal judge,
was impeached by the Senate. Nixon sought review of the Senate’s impeachment procedure (which involved the use of a
committee to take testimony and gather evidence), claiming
that the Senate failed to give him a full evidentiary hearing before the entire Senate. The Supreme Court decided that the
Senate had sole discretion to establish impeachment procedures and thus the issue presented a political question.
Applying the Baker factors, the Court found that impeachment procedure was a textually demonstrated commitment to another branch—the Court stated that “the word ‘sole’
indicates that this authority is reposed in the Senate and no43
where else.” The Court also determined that there were no judicially manageable standards for resolving the issue—the Impeachment Clause’s use of the word “try” lacked “sufficient
44
precision” to allow for judicial interpretation.
The Supreme Court has repeatedly held that cases alleging
a violation of the Guarantee Clause present nonjusticiable po45
46
litical questions. Luther v. Borden is generally regarded as
47
the seminal case. The dispute in Luther involved two rival
governments that were each vying to be the legal government
48
of Rhode Island. In the 1840s, Rhode Island was governed by
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.

Id. at 217 (numbering added).
Nixon, 506 U.S. 224.
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3.
Nixon, 506 U.S. at 229.
Id. at 230.
ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, FEDERAL JURISDICTION 154 (5th ed. 2007).
48 U.S. (7 How.) 1 (1849).
See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 45, at 154.
Luther, 48 U.S. (7 How.) at 35–37.
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an old royal charter that had been established in the seventeenth century. When a new state constitution was proposed
and ratified in 1841, the incumbent government enacted a law
prohibiting elections under the new constitution and imposed
49
martial law. Martin Luther was an election commissioner under the new government. In 1842, Sheriff Luther Borden broke
into Luther’s home to search for evidence of illegal electioneering activity, and Luther sued for trespass. Borden asserted that
the search was a lawful exercise of his governmental power but
Luther argued that Rhode Island’s charter was not “republican”
in character and that Borden acted pursuant to an unconstitutional government’s orders.
The Supreme Court declined to address the merits of the
case because it posed a nonjusticiable political question. The
Court held that the question presented was for congressional,
not judicial, resolution: “For as the United States guarantee to
each state a republican government, Congress must necessarily
decide what government is established in the State before it
50
can determine whether it is republican or not.” The Court
thus let stand the new state constitution and left Luther to his
fate.
Since deciding Luther, the Supreme Court has never expressly found that a state government or state action violates
51
the Guarantee Clause. But the Court has held that such
52
claims are nonjusticiable. In Pacific States Telephone & Tele53
graph Co. v. Oregon, for example, the Court addressed allegations that a republican form of government is one in which the
people of a state must elect representatives to govern; direct
democracy was claimed to be antithetical to a republican gov54
ernment. The case concerned an amendment to Oregon’s constitution adopting voter initiative and referendum. A law taxing certain classes of corporations was then passed pursuant to
the amendment, and an Oregon corporation neglected to pay
the tax. When the State sued to collect the tax, the corporation
defended on the theory that the adoption of the initiative and
49. See WIECEK, supra note 1, at 113.
50. Luther, 48 U.S. (7 How.) at 42. The Court also noted that allowing judicial challenges to the lawful authority of state governments would create
practical difficulties. Id. at 44.
51. See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 45, at 154.
52. See Pac. States Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Oregon, 223 U.S. 118, 133 (1912);
Taylor v. Beckham, 178 U.S. 548, 578–79 (1900).
53. Pac. States Tel. & Tel. Co., 223 U.S. at 118.
54. Id. at 136–38.
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referendum destroyed all government republican in form in Oregon. The Court found that the claim at issue was a political
question because the assault was “not on the tax as a tax, but
55
on the State as a State.” The Court highlighted the difference
between “the legislative duty to determine the political questions involved in deciding whether a state government republican in form exists, and “the judicial power and ever-present duty . . . to enforce and uphold the applicable provisions of the
Constitution as to each and every exercise of governmental
56
power.” Despite not reaching the merits of the Guarantee
Clause claim, Pacific States ensured that the initiative process
would remain free from Guarantee Clause challenges in the
years that followed.
Today, however, the justiciability barrier may not be as
57
formidable as it once was. In New York v. United States, the
Court signaled a possible shift in the justiciability of Guarantee
Clause claims. The case involved a challenge by the state of
New York against federal legislation that, among other things,
forced the states to “take title” to low-level radioactive waste.
While the central holding of New York was that this “take title”
provision violated the Tenth Amendment, the Court also addressed New York’s Guarantee Clause claim and whether it
was justiciable. The Court noted that Luther’s “limited holding”
about who could decide the legitimacy of the Rhode Island government had “metamorphosed into the sweeping assertion that
‘[v]iolation of the great guaranty of a republican form of gov58
ernment in States cannot be challenged in the courts.’” Prior
to the elevation of Luther “into a general rule of
nonjusticiability,” the Court noted that it had “addressed the
merits of claims founded on the Guarantee Clause without any
59
suggestion that the claims were not justiciable.” Though the
Court intimated that courts could reach the merits of Guarantee Clause claims, “at least in some circumstances,” it opted not
to lay down a general rule because New York’s claims would
60
have failed on the merits anyways. The Supreme Court’s suggestion that the justiciability barrier is not absolute may have

55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.

Id. at 150.
Id.
505 U.S. 144 (1992).
Id. at 184 (quoting Colegrove v. Green, 328 U.S. 549, 556 (1946)).
Id.
Id. at 185–86.

2013]

STATE CONSTITUTIONS

1813

implications for the judiciary’s role in considering popularly
enacted state provisions.
II. THE CONTRADICTORY NATURE OF
REPRESENTATIVE GOVERNMENT
A. STATE VOTER INITIATIVE AND REFERENDUM
The initiative and referendum are forms of direct democracy that arose in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centu61
ries. Since then, direct-legislation devices have been used by
62
many states to guide and formulate state policy. The citizens
of several states have embraced the concept of popular participation in the legislative process and some have amended their
63
state constitutions to guarantee direct democracy.
The initiative allows the people to propose state or local
legislation through petitions, for enactment or rejection at the
64
polls. Voter initiatives can either enact or repeal laws, but the
proposals must not exceed the scope of the government’s power.
For example, the proposed law must not violate the Contracts
Clause; it cannot be discriminatory, arbitrary, or unreasonable;
and it cannot contravene state limits, statutes, or policy. The
initiative process itself is considered political speech and is protected under the First and Fourteenth Amendments of the U.S.
65
Constitution.
Voter referendums also enable direct participation in the
legislative process. When electorates are given the power to
vote by referendum, they can require a legislative body to submit legislation to reexamination by the people. Many state constitutions, charters, and statutes provide that a governing body
must submit proposed action to referendum, reconsider legisla-

61. See generally RICHARD HOFSTADTER, THE AGE OF REFORM, 255, 265–
66 (1959) (discussing the restoration of popular government).
62. Timothy M. Tymkovich, Colorado Survey: Recent Legislation and Colorado Supreme Court Decisions Referendum and Rezoning, 53 U. COLO. L.
REV. 745, 749 (1982).
63. Id.
64. See Natelson, supra note 9, at 808 n.2.
65. See Buckley v. Am. Constitutional Law Found., 525 U.S. 182, 192
(1999) (finding that the First Amendment requires vigilance in judging the validity of restrictions on the initiative process); Yes on Term Limits, Inc. v. Savage, 550 F.3d 1023, 1030–31 (10th Cir. 2008) (finding that Oklahoma’s ban on
non-resident petition circulators violated the First and Fourteenth Amendments of the U. S. Constitution).
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tion upon a petition signed by a certain percent of voters, or
66
subject enacted legislation to a popular referendum.
Challenges to voter proposals through initiative and referendum can be either procedural or substantive, and the ade67
quacy of a petition can be challenged in court. Sometimes proposals are disqualified because they contain more than one
subject or do not comport with other procedural requirements.
A voter proposal will be disqualified when, if enacted, the
measure would be unconstitutional on some other ground.
Critics of participatory democracy assert that it has the potential to destroy representative government as required by the
68
U.S. Constitution. Voter initiative and referendum procedures
have also been criticized for allowing the exploitation of emotional social issues, creating poorly drafted laws that are difficult to amend or repeal, incapacitating legislatures, and mo69
nopolizing the agenda of public discourse. Other problems
arise when money is used for signature gathering and advertising.
Despite such criticisms, many states have a strong tradition of supporting direct legislation. For example, in 1910, Colorado voters overwhelmingly adopted a constitutional amend70
ment guaranteeing the initiative and referendum.
The
amendment was codified in article V of the Colorado Constitution. When faced with challenges to the scope of the initiative
and referendum, Colorado courts have generally deferred to the
amendment, citing the enabling language of the state constitution, which states, “[a]ll political power is vested in and derived
71
from the people.”
B. DIRECT DEMOCRACY AND THE GUARANTEE CLAUSE
Although the language of the Guarantee Clause seems to
require each state in the Union to maintain a representative
democracy, courts have generally allowed states to legislate
66. See, e.g., COLO. CONST. art V, § 1.
67. See Craig B. Holman, Judicial Review of Ballot Initiatives: The
Changing Role of State and Federal Courts, 31 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1239, 1242–
44 (1998) (discussing ways to challenge voter initiatives).
68. Tymkovich, supra note 62, at 749.
69. See, e.g., Daniel M. Warner, Direct Democracy: The Right of People to
Make Fools of Themselves; The Use and Abuse of Initiative and Referendum, A
Local Government Perspective, 19 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 47, 77–84 (1995) (discussing problems in drafting, voter approval, and execution stages).
70. Id.
71. COLO. CONST. art. II, § 1.
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72

through voter initiative and referendum. A distinction, however, can be drawn that could result in a challenge to a voter
initiative or referendum: an attack on the process of initiative
and referendum may be different than an attack on the legislation that results from such process.
For example, critics who oppose voter initiative and referendum argue that the results of voter-controlled legislation can
have a cumulative effect that undermines the republican na73
ture of state governments. In Death by a Thousand Cuts: The
Guarantee Clause Regulation of State Constitutions, Jacob Heller argues that the Guarantee Clause should be used to invalidate specific policies that threaten, but do not necessarily de74
stroy, a state’s republican form of government. This reasoning
is based on the premise that the question of when the outer
limits imposed by the Guarantee Clause are triggered is one of
degree. Thus, the initiative and referendum process itself may
not be enough to implicate the Clause, but when the results of
the process reach a certain degree of deviation from republican
norms, they may become subject to the limits of the Clause.
But no court has examined specific provisions as testing
those outer limits, nor has the Supreme Court suggested in any
case that particular provisions resulting from the initiative
process call into question the essential republicanism of state
constitutions.
III. THE CHALLENGE TO STATE-INITIATED MEASURES
AND THE MEANING OF THE GUARANTEE CLAUSE
If plaintiffs can clear the justiciability hurdle, the disposition of their claims will hinge on the proper interpretation of
the Guarantee Clause. This depends in part on the how the
Clause was intended to restrict state government. If the Clause
was intended to prohibit only blatant state violations of fundamental republican concepts, then a state can argue that the
Clause does not apply to run-of-the-mill constitutional provi72. See, e.g., Rossi v. Brown, 889 P.2d 557, 560 (Cal. 1995) (construing
state constitutional provisions liberally in favor of the people’s right to exercise the powers of initiative and referendum); Margolis v. Dist. Court, 638 P.2d
297, 304–05 (Colo. 1981) (upholding the power of Colorado’s citizens to review
rezoning decisions of municipal governments through referendum elections);
Okla. Tax Comm’n v. Smith, 610 P.2d 794, 806 (Okla. 1980) (holding that the
state legislature could not change a question pending before the people by initiative or referendum).
73. See Heller, supra note 7, at 1713.
74. Id. at 1716.
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sions—they do not turn state government into a monarchy or
unauthorized outlier form of government. But if the purpose of
the Clause is to require states to maintain substantially representative democracies through the use of traditional separation-of-powers techniques, some measures may raise sufficient
concerns to interest courts in the line-drawing process such an
inquiry would seem to require.
Even if a court concludes that the Guarantee Clause imposes more-than-minimal requirements on state government,
establishing where the floor for republican government lies will
be an interesting task. Originalist interpretations of this question tend to yield a more limited set of requirements, given the
75
Founders’ toleration of diverse forms of state governments. An
interpretation done through the lens of political theory—with
less fluid definitions of “republic” and “democracy”—will probably yield a more robust set of requirements.
In New York, the Supreme Court hinted at a possible approach to adjudicating Guarantee Clause claims based on federal legislation aimed at state governments. Without deciding
the justiciability question, the Court found that neither federal
monetary incentives for the state to dispose of radioactive
waste nor the exclusion of waste producers from disposal sites
in other states denied “any State a republican form of govern76
ment.” The Court reasoned that, because the States had a “legitimate choice” whether to accept the federal incentives, they
retained “the ability to set their legislative agendas” and “state
government officials remain accountable to the local elec77
torate.”
While some of New York’s criteria—state control over legislative agendas and state official accountability—may shed light
on what constitutes “republican” government, they shed little
light on how the Court would come out on other challenges,
such as limits on a state’s taxing and spending powers that are
not imposed by federal legislation but adopted by the states
themselves. In New York, the claim was that federal legislation
was denying the states the ability to maintain an autonomous
government. The focus was on the distribution of power between the states and the federal government, not on the distribution of power within a state. The latter scenario raises a
75. See, e.g., Natelson, supra note 9, at 814–15 (arguing that the Founders
accepted a wide range of citizen lawmaking).
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much harder question: whether legislative control and electoral
accountability can even be threatened when both voting and
lawmaking remain exclusively within a state. A court’s review
of a particular piece of legislation passed under a state initiative or voter referendum will highlight the difficulty of judicial
line drawing in this situation.
CONCLUSION
The point of this Article has not been to consider the legal
merits of a challenge to the state initiative power or particular
measures resulting from that process, but to outline some of
the concerns and questions in any Guarantee Clause challenge.
It seems inevitable we are likely to see more Guarantee Clause
claims directed at products of direct democracy. The political
climate is polarized and factions on each side of the aisle are
resorting to various initiatives and referendums to bypass
stalemated or reluctant state legislatures. Meanwhile, their respective opponents will continue to use the courts to stop them.
But the introduction of the Baker factors in future cases
and New York’s statement that the justiciability bar may not be
absolute has given courts an opening to consider the
justiciability of Guarantee Clause challenges. Unless the Supreme Court speaks otherwise, lower courts might take up the
challenge. Yet it is still uncertain whether courts will know
where to go with Guarantee Clause claims once they have
crossed the justiciability barrier.

